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ABSTRACT 
Ecumenical Alethic Pluralism (EAP) is a novel kind of alethic pluralism. It is ecumenical in 
that it widens the scope of alethic pluralism by allowing for a normatively deflated truth 
property alongside a variety of normatively robust truth properties. We establish EAP by 
showing how Wright's Inflationary Arguments fail in the domain of taste, once a relativist 
treatment of the metaphysics and epistemology of that domain is endorsed. EAP is highly 
significant to current debates on the nature of truth insofar as it involves a reconfiguration of 
the dialectic between deflationists and pluralists. 
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1. Introduction 
Alethic pluralism—roughly, the thesis that truth amounts to different properties in different 
domains—comes in a variety of forms.1 Taking truth to be a normative (and thus inflationary) 
property is common to virtually all2 known versions of pluralism. This is owing to two arguments 
offered by Crispin Wright, known as Inflationary Arguments (henceforth IAs),3 which aim to show 
that since truth functions as a distinctive norm, it thereby has a normative, and thus inflationary, 
nature. Although the IAs play a central strategic role for truth pluralists, there are surprisingly few 
critical discussions of them. 
                                                 
1 See Wright (2013). 
2 Some authors advocate non-inflationary truth pluralism. Beall (2013) develops deflationary pluralism in reply to 
paradoxes. Kölbel 2013 cites questionnaires to support the idea that people deploy two distinct truth concepts: one 
inflationary, the other non-inflationary. These are non-domain-based pluralisms, and thus differ significantly from EAP. 
See Barnard & Ulatowski (forthcoming) for data concerning the empirical adequacy of a domain-based alethic pluralism 
with a non-inflationary truth. 
3 Wright (1992, unpublished manuscript).  
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 Our objective in this paper is twofold. First, we critically assess Wright’s IAs. We show how 
a local counterexample can be construed by developing a subjectivist and relativist metaphysical 
and epistemological framework, pertaining to the domain of basic taste.4 This provides us with what 
is needed to block the IAs in that domain. We argue that the local failure of the IAs does not entail 
that they are globally unsuccessful: in some domains, where the metaphysics and epistemology we 
develop for taste does not apply, the IAs go through. This establishes what we call Alethic Dualism, 
the view that there are two distinct truth properties: a non-normative truth property in the domain of 
taste (and possibly others), and a normative truth property applying elsewhere. Second, once alethic 
dualism is on board we work our way towards an ecumenical form of pluralism. By means of what 
is known as the scope problem for monistic inflationary accounts of truth,5 we argue that there are 
at least two normative truth properties. This delivers a wider form of pluralism than those already 
present in the literature. Specifically, it is a form of pluralism in which we have a non-normative 
truth property operating (at least) in the domain of taste alongside a plurality of normative truth 
properties that operate elsewhere. We call this view Ecumenical Alethic Pluralism (EAP).  
 The structure of this paper is as follows. In section 2, we examine Wright’s IAs. Section 3 
provides a subjectivist and relativistic epistemology and metaphysics of taste. In sections 4 and 5, 
we develop our strategies for blocking the IAs within the domain of taste. Section 6 discusses the 
significance of our counterexample to IAs vis-à-vis alethic pluralism. Finally, sections 7 and 8 
introduce ecumenical alethic pluralism, locating it within the current debate on truth pluralism.  
2. The two anti-deflationary arguments 
                                                 
4 We focus on basic taste judgements, e.g., “this sushi is delicious”. For simplicity, we will omit ‘basic’ from now on. 
5 Lynch (2009).  
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Most philosophers agree that judgement is governed by norms.6 Nevertheless, there is disagreement 
about what these norms consist in and moreover how to formulate them. In discussing Wright’s IAs, 
we assume that both truth and justification7 are norms of judgement. They both provide criteria for 
the correctness of the formation, maintenance, and rejection of judgements. The questions at the 
core of the IAs are whether truth and justification provide the same or distinct norms, and, if distinct, 
what accounts for truth’s normative function. Wright’s conclusion is threefold: (i) truth and 
justification mark distinct norms of judgement; (ii) truth’s normative function is a feature of its 
nature; (iii) qua normative property, truth plays an explanatory role vis-à-vis the core phenomena of 
enquiry.  
 The IAs are intended to apply globally (i.e., to all truth-apt domains), targeting those 
deflationary views sharing the following set of commitments: function; propositionality; exhaustion; 
abundance; and non-normativity.8 According to function, truth is a device for expressing indirect 
endorsement of a claim or collection of claims. Propositionality refers to the thesis that propositions 
are the primary truth-bearers. According to exhaustion, all facts whose expression involves truth can 
be explained by assuming nothing more than (non-pathological) instances of the Equivalence 
Schema (ES): 
 (ES)  <p> is true if and only if p. 
According to abundance, truth is a genuine property, that is, ‘true’ functions in language as a 
meaningful predicate. As such, it refers to a genuine property. Finally, non-normativity is the thesis 
that truth’s nature isn’t normative.  
                                                 
6 See Chan (2013).   
7 We focus on propositional justification. 
8 We take Horwich (1998) to be a paradigmatic example of a view endorsing these commitments.  
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Wright’s IAs purport to show that truth qualifies as inflationary. This is because truth has a 
normative nature—i.e., it marks a sui generis norm of judgement—contributing to an explanation 
of the core phenomena of enquiry. We argue that counterexamples can be found to IAs in the domain 
of taste. This means that a non-normative option is available, albeit only locally. This leaves open 
whether the IAs go through in other domains. In fact, we argue that they do.  
2.1 Wright’s first inflationary argument (IA1) 
IA1 has two stages.9 Stage one establishes that truth and justification coincide in positive normative 
force by first noticing that a reason to regard a proposition as justified is a reason to endorse it as a 
belief, and conversely. Second, a reason to endorse a proposition as a belief is, by (ES), a reason to 
regard the proposition as true, and conversely. Thus, a reason to regard a proposition as justified is 
a reason to regard it as true, and conversely.10 This establishes that truth and justification, qua norms 
of judgement, coincide in positive normative force. That is to say, in judging that <p>, a subject, in 
taking herself to comply with the truth norm, thereby takes herself to comply with the justification 
norm (and vice versa).  
A legitimate question at this point is the following: in virtue of what is truth normative? 
Given the normative coincidence just observed, a reasonable answer would be to say that truth is 
normative in virtue of justification’s being normative—i.e., truth’s normative character is inherited 
from the normative character of justification. However, this answer faces an objection, which leads 
to the second stage of the argument. Clearly, a belief can be justified without being true, and it can 
                                                 
9 Wright (1992). We offer our own reconstruction of the arguments. 
10 Wright (1992,18). 
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be true without being justified. Formally, while ‘true’ commutes with negation, ‘justified’ does not. 
Thus, the following equivalence holds for truth:11 
(NE) <p> is not true if and only if <not p> is true. 
However, an analogous principle of justification (NE-J) fails from the left-to-right direction: 
(NE-J)  <p> is not justified if and only if <not-p> is justified. 
This failure is owing to the possibility of epistemically neutral states of information: 
(Epistemic Neutrality) A subject, S, is in an epistemically neutral informational state, i, with 
respect to <p> just in case i provides S with neither a justification for <p> nor a justification 
for <not-p>. 
Relative to a neutral state of information, both <p> and <not-p> fall outside the extension of 
‘justified’. If either <p> or <not-p> fall within the extension of ‘true’, we can infer that truth and 
justification potentially diverge in extension. Thus, whereas the extension of ‘justified’ is potentially 
gappy in that, for some <p>, neither <p> nor its negation falls within its extension, this is not the 
case for truth. ‘True’ and ‘justified’ potentially diverge in extension. Let us call this Normative 
Divergence. 
In sum, according to IA1: (i) truth and justification function as norms governing judgement; 
(ii) they coincide in terms of positive normative force; (iii) however, they signal two distinct norms 
owing to their potential divergence in extension; (iv) this means that truth’s normative character is 
not inherited from that of justification; (v) thus, truth’s normative character marks a distinctive 
feature of truth; (vi) owing to its sui generis normative nature, truth contribute explaining some 
                                                 
11 We ignore the possibility of a truth-value gap for p—see Wright (1992, 61-4) for discussion. To meet intuitionistic 
anxieties, NE can be reformulated as the principle that (necessarily) it is not the case that neither p nor not-p are in the 
in the extension of the truth-property. 
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normative phenomena at the core of our practice of enquiry. For instance, truth contributes to the 
explanation of, for example, the appropriateness of praising whoever judges truly, and criticising 
whoever endorses an untrue judgement. Moreover, as Price (1998) argues, truth’s normative nature 
is what grounds the possibility of a certain kind of objective disagreement—as opposed to a mere 
difference of opinion. In virtue of these explanatory functions, the argument aims to conclude that 
truth’s normative character inflates truth’s nature. 
2.2 Wright’s second inflationary argument (IA2) 
A structurally similar argument, hinging on the defeasible character of justification, establishes a 
second potential divergence based on the thought that justification, but not truth, can be lost through 
time. While a past or future tense claim12—e.g., that p was/will be the case—cannot be true at a time 
unless the claim about the embedded (say, present tense, for simplicity) proposition is true at an 
earlier/later time, this does not hold generally for justification. The justification for past/future tense 
claims can fail even if there is a justification for the embedded proposition at an earlier/later time.  
To illustrate: at t1, Jülide is justified in believing the true proposition, <p>, that Elias is the 
murderer on evidence, e, but at a later time, t2, she acquires new evidence, e*, showing that e is 
misleading and thus defeats Jülide’s previous justification for <p>. Thus, at t2, relative to evidence 
e*, it is false that Jülide, at t1, was justified in believing <p>, even though, as a matter of fact, <p> 
was and remains true.  
According to Wright, there are core principles connecting the truth-values of differently-
tensed judgments made at different times. He calls these truth-value links:13 
(fut/pres–T) ∀t1 [(T[t1](Will:p)) iff ∃t2 (t2> t1) (T[t2](p))]  
                                                 
12 We assume that “it will be the case that p” and “it was the case that p” express, respectively, the propositions that it 
will be the case that p and that it was the case that p. 
13 An earlier discussion of the truth-value links can be found in Wright (1993). 
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(past/pres–T) ∀t2 [(T[t2](Was:p)) iff ∃t1 (t1<t2) (T[t1](p))] 
The corresponding principles connecting justification and tensed judgments would be the following: 
(fut/pres–J) ∀t1 [(J[t1](Will:p)) iff ∃t2 (t2> t1) (J[t2](p))]  
(past/pres–J) ∀t2 [(J[t2](Was:p)) iff ∃t1 (t1<t2)  (J[t1](p))] 
where “J[t](p)” means that p is justified at time t, analogously “T[t](p)” means that p is true at time t, 
and “Was:p”, “Will:p” mean, respectively, that it was the case that p and that it will be the case that 
p. 
Wright discusses the divergence between truth and justification with respect to both future 
and past tense taste judgments. We focus only on past tense taste judgments—i.e., we consider only 
the past/pres T- and J-links, which we will call, hereon, “T-link” and “J-link”, respectively. Parallel 
arguments can be given in relation to future tense judgments about taste. 
Since justification is relative to states of information, we rephrase the (past/pres-J) principle 
by doubly relativizing justification to informational states and times. One subject is justified at time 
t given the evidence available to her at the informational state k in believing that it was the case that 
p, just in case at an earlier time and informational state i she was justified in believing that p on the 
basis of the evidence in i. The amended J-link reads: 
 (J-Link) ∀t2, k [(J[k,t2] (Was:p)) ↔ ∃t1, i (t1<t2) (J[i,t1] (p))] 
Wright argues that whereas either direction of the J-Link can fail—since justification can be 
improved or defeated—this is not the case for the T-link. To see this, consider the following 
diachronic divergence lemmas (DDLs): 
(DDL-1) ∃i,k ∃t2,t1 (t2>t1): [J[i,t1](p) & T[t1](p) & T[t2](Was:p) & not-J[k,t2](Was:p)]. 
(DDL-2) ∃ i,k ∃t2,t1 (t2>t1): [J[k,t2](Was:p) & T[t1](p) & T[t2](Was:p) & not-J[i,t1](p)]. 
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These DDLs establish a contrast between two norms of belief rejection, one imposed by truth and 
the other by justification: 
(T-Rejection)  A subject S’s rejection of a previously accepted proposition <p> is correct 
only if <p> is false. 
(J-Rejection)  A subject S’s rejection at t of a previously accepted proposition <p> is correct 
only if S’s informational states i at t contains (temporarily undefeated) 
evidence that defeats (either by overriding or by undermining) the 
justification S previously possessed for <p>. 
J-rejection requires Jülide to reject her judgment because the evidence on which it was based is 
undermined by her new evidence. By contrast, T-rejection predicts that she ought not reject her 
previous judgment because true. Conversely, we might have a situation where a subject ought to 
reject a judgment because false even though, by following J-rejection, she wouldn't have to reject it 
because her justification remains undefeated. This reinforces the conclusion that truth has a 
distinctive normative nature, concurring with the explanation of the core normative phenomena of 
enquiry associated with judgement, rejection, and disagreement.  
3. Subjectivism and relativism about taste 
To locally block both IAs, we outline a subjectivist and relativist metaphysics and epistemology of 
taste according to which: (i) taste properties—e.g., being tasty—and the justification for taste 
judgements are fully grounded in the subject (subjectivism); and (ii) any change in the subject’s 
gustatory experience makes a difference with respect to the instantiation of a taste property and to 
the availability of justification (relativism). 
3.1 Metaphysics of taste 
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Our metaphysics of taste has two core aspects: (i) metaphysical subjectivism, i.e., the thesis that the 
instantiation of taste properties—e.g., the property of being tasty—entirely depends on the tastes of 
the beholder; (ii) metaphysical relativism, i.e., the thesis that different beholders with different tastes 
give rise to different facts about what is (and is not) tasty.   
According to metaphysical subjectivism, the instantiation of a taste property fully depends 
on the gustatory responses (GRs) of the subject. This amounts to a form of response dependence. In 
what follows, we focus on the properties of tastiness and distastefulness that we take to be 
paradigmatic cases for, respectively, positive and negative (basic) gustatory evaluations. According 
to response-dependence, whether a given gustatory object possesses a taste property entirely 
depends on the pleasurable/unpleasant responses of the subject to her gustatory experience of that 
object. 
The second component of our metaphysics of taste is metaphysical relativism. What taste 
facts there are is entirely determined by the set of gustatory responses of a subject. Alterations in the 
subject, or changes in her gustatory responses, engender a change in the world of taste—conceived 
as a triplet including a world, time, and subject. As a consequence, the extension of a taste property 
is relative to the world of taste of a subject. Reality is thus composed of two sorts of facts: objective 
facts—e.g., facts about the physical composition of objects, whose occurrence is independent of any 
subject’s perspective—and perspectival facts—e.g., taste facts—which cannot be apprehended from 
a bird's-eye view, and therefore whose occurrence depends on a particular perspective.14 Which taste 
facts obtain is a matter that can only be established once one is immersed in a perspective.15 
                                                 
14 The totality of taste-facts relative to a subject constitutes her world of taste. 
15 Our metaphysical relativism is related to Fine’s external relativism. See Fine (2005, 278-84). See also Einheuser 
(2008), and Spencer (2016). 
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These two theses are mutually supportive. Metaphysical relativism safeguards metaphysical 
subjectivism from contradiction: given two subjects with different gustatory responses, a taste 
property can consistently be instantiated and not instantiated by the same object since it is always 
relative to a subject irrespective of whether the object has that property. Metaphysical subjectivism 
endorses metaphysical relativism since it grounds the relativity predicted by metaphysical 
relativism. According to metaphysical subjectivism, the subject's gustatory experiences and 
responses shape the subject’s perspective on the world of taste: different perspectives involve 
different true propositions about taste—and thus different taste facts.  
Our metaphysics of taste can be expressed by the following relativized form of response 
dependence: 
(RRD) x is tasty/distasteful relative to a world of taste <w,s,t> if and only if (because) x 
produces at t in w a gustatory experience P with a certain phenomenological quality  (e.g., 
pleasantness or unpleasantness) in S such that P engenders, in the absence of any disabling 
factor, a pleasurable/unpleasant response in the subject at t in w. 
RRD gives us an alternative to a thoroughgoing realist conception of taste by offering a model that, 
while being compatible with classical semantics and allowing for taste properties existing in the 
world, it rejects the thought that their instantiation is an absolute, mind-independent matter.16  
We are aware that RRD has an unintuitive drawback: it predicts that any gustatory object of 
which a subject has had no experience falls within the anti-extension of every taste property (e.g., it 
is not-tasty, not-disgusting, etc.) relative to the subject. However, notice that saying an object falls 
within the anti-extension of a gustatory property (e.g., being tasty) does not mean that it falls within 
the extension of any of its contrary properties (e.g., being distasteful). In order for an object to fall 
                                                 
16 See Ferrari and Moruzzi (forthcoming) for a version of (RRD) compatible with non-classical semantics. 
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within the extension of being distasteful relative to a subject, the subject must have had a displeasing 
response to it. One way of assuaging the unpalatableness of this drawback is suggested by 
Williamson (1997, 223-26). The idea is that the negation of an atomic predicate is maximally 
unspecific, that is, it is uncommitted to anything specific about the object to which it applies. This 
introduces an asymmetry between the instantiation of an atomic property and the instantiation of its 
negation: when nothing grounds the application of an atomic property to an object, the object 
remains maximally unspecific with respect to that property and it thus falls within its anti-extension 
instead of neither falling in the extension nor in the anti-extension. 
3.2 Epistemology of taste 
There are two components to our epistemology of taste: (i) epistemic subjectivism—the thesis that 
the justification for a taste proposition consists in and is exhausted by the subject’s GRs to her 
experience; and (ii) epistemic relativism—the thesis that what counts as evidence for a taste 
proposition varies according to the GRs of the subject.  
In characterizing epistemic subjectivism, we idealise the epistemic condition of a subject S. 
First, we assume that there is an a priori justification for RRD available to S. Second, we assume 
that S has epistemic access to those parts of her informational state that are relevant to her gustatory 
experiences. If S has a gustatory experience with a specific phenomenological quality (either 
positive, negative, or neutral), she thereby has justification to believe that she had such an experience 
with that quality. Moreover, if she has no experience, she will have justification to believe that she 
has had no experience. We thus endorse the following principles:  
(PAGE) Positive Accessibility of Gustatory Experience: if S has a gustatory experience of x 
with a certain phenomenological quality , then S has justification to believe that she has 
had such an experience of x with quality .  
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(NAGE) Negative Accessibility of Gustatory Experience: if S has no gustatory experience 
of x, then S has justification to believe that she has had no gustatory experience of x.17  
Epistemic subjectivism is in harmony with the thesis that the only source of justification for a taste 
proposition is first-personal gustatory experience. We can call this the primacy of experience thesis. 
This excludes from the set of sources of justification other grounds, such as testimony, in full 
agreement with the so-called acquaintance principle,18 according to which evidence for a judgement 
about taste must be acquired through first-hand experience and cannot be transmitted from person 
to person. 
The second component of our epistemology of taste is epistemic relativism: what counts as 
evidence for a taste proposition is relative to a subject’s epistemic perspective at a particular time. 
The epistemic perspective encompasses, but is not limited to, the subject’s GRs at t. Call ‘s’ a 
particular piece of sushi. Whether or not a justification for <s is tasty> is available to a subject is a 
matter relative to the subject’s gustatory responses at a certain time: if two different times involve 
different gustatory responses—e.g., the subject has first, at time t1, a pleasant response and then, at 
a later time t2, an unpleasant response—then <s is tasty> is justified for that subject relative to t1 but 
unjustified relative to t2.  
The relativistic component to the epistemology of taste is not just another way of cashing 
out the subjectivist thesis. Epistemic subjectivism allows that whether or not one’s GRs dictate that 
the food is tasty is an absolute epistemic fact that can be appreciated by any epistemic agent. What 
epistemic relativism calls into question is precisely the idea of absolute epistemic facts about taste 
                                                 
17 These principles impose a transparency condition on gustatory experience in relation to justification. Williamson 
(2000, 24-7) defines transparency in relation to knowledge. We are committed to holding that the mental state of having 
a gustatory experience is transparent. However, it is not obvious that it is plausible to assume, as Williamson (2000, 
ch.4) does in his anti-luminosity argument for the experience of cold, that a series of indiscriminable differences in the 
supervenience base of basic taste properties can produce a sorites-like sequence for gustatory experiences. 
18 See Wollheim (1980). 
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propositions. Call s a particular piece of sushi. If my GRs to sushi provide a justification for <s is 
tasty>, then even if my previous GRs were different this would not now count as evidence for the 
fact that I was justified in believing that sushi is not tasty: relative to my informational state, what 
counts as evidence for <s is tasty> is entirely determined by the information compatible with my 
current GRs. 
A detached point of view on matters of taste is thus excluded. Since a subject either has had 
or has not had an experience of the relevant food, she determines both the extension of the taste-
property—via RRD and the primacy of experience—and the justificatory status of the relevant taste 
proposition. Call this feature perspectival immersion. 
4. How to block IA1 
IA1 relies on the possibility of neutral states of information. The features of the metaphysics and 
epistemology of taste discussed above provide a basis for arguing against the possibility of epistemic 
neutrality in the domain of taste. Thus, IA1 fails locally. 
Notice, first, that there are two potential sources of epistemic neutrality:19 i) 
phenomenological neutrality, which occurs when a subject has a gustatory experience with a 
qualitative aspect engendering in the subject a neutral response (of neither pleasure nor displeasure); 
ii) radical neutrality, which occurs when a subject has no gustatory experience whatsoever of a 
particular gustatory object. We argue that neither source gives rise to epistemic neutrality in the 
domain of taste.  
                                                 
19 Note that both the absence of a gustatory experience and the presence of a pleasant experience are sufficient conditions 
for enforcing the negation of the left-hand-side of RRD. The production of a contrary experience (distastefulness), or 
the absence of any experience, are conditions that are incompatible with the right-hand-side of RRD—i.e., with the 
existence of a pleasant experience. 
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Phenomenological neutrality occurs when a subject has had a gustatory experience of an 
object with a phenomenologically neutral character. Consider again our example of sushi s and 
suppose S is in an informational state i such that she has a phenomenologically neutral experience 
of s. Because the response is not pleasant, via RRD, we can claim that s lacks the property of 
tastiness. If we assume that S has an a priori justification at i for RRD, and moreover that she can 
introspect her gustatory experiences in order to obtain justification at i such that she believes she 
has a phenomenologically neutral experience (via PAGE), then, via closure of justification under 
logical consequence, we obtain that S has justification at i to believe that s isn’t tasty. Thus, if S is 
in an informational state i of phenomenological neutrality with respect to s, she has justification at i 
for <s is not tasty>, which is incompatible with being in a state of epistemic neutrality. 
Radical neutrality obtains in cases of absolute lack of gustatory experience of s. Assume that 
S is at t in a state of radical neutrality i with respect to s. According to NAGE, S is at t justified in 
believing that she has had no gustatory experience of s if, in fact, she has had no gustatory experience 
of s at that time. Radical neutrality and NAGE thus entail that at t S has justification at i and t for 
the negation of the right-hand-side of RRD. Call this latter fact J-Absence. Assuming that S has a 
justification at i for RRD, it follows, by closure of justification under logical consequence and J-
Absence, that S at t has a justification at i for <s is not tasty>, which is incompatible with being in a 
state of epistemic neutrality.20 
Thus, our framework excludes the possibility that a subject can be in a state of epistemic 
neutrality in the taste domain. This is regardless of whether its putative source is radical or 
phenomenological neutrality. No normative divergence between truth and justification has been 
established in the taste domain.  
                                                 
20 These arguments can be generalized to taste properties (e.g., being distastefulness). 
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5. How to block IA2 
IA2 is purported to show that truth is a normative property because it marks distinctive norms of 
acceptance and rejection targeting future- and past-tensed judgements. As for IA1, the inflationary 
significance of IA2 has to do with the potential extensional divergence between truth and 
justification in virtue of their different normative roles. We challenge the soundness of the 
divergence lemmas in the taste domain. To recap, the principles in play in IA2 are: 
(T-Link) ∀t2 [(T[t2](Was:p)) ↔ ∃t1 (t1<t2)(T[t1](p))] 
(J-Link) ∀t2, k [(J[k,t2] (Was:p)) ↔ ∃t1, i (t1<t2) (J[i,t1] (p))] 
A possible divergence in extension between truth and justification can be established because, while 
the T-Link always holds, the J-link fails in both directions. On the one hand, we have the possibility 
of defeaters, “because new information overrides or undermines an earlier warranted assertion about 
a then contemporaneous situation”.21 On the other hand, retrospective discoveries are possible, 
“because it might happen that we acquire a warrant for thinking that something was earlier so for 
which there was no evidence at the time”.22 We refute these two putative directions of failure of the 
J-link in relation to taste propositions. 
Let us first examine the left-to-right direction of the J-link. The ground for its failure is given 
by the possibility of retrospective discoveries (DDL-2). Consider the specific sample of sushi s. 
There is a time t2 and an informational state i in which the subject acquires justification at i for <Was: 
s is tasty> even though at no time t1 earlier than t2 and informational state k there is justification 
available to the subject for <s is tasty>. Given the primacy of experience, the only way to acquire 
justification for <s is tasty> is through direct gustatory experience. A justification for <Was: s is 
                                                 
21 Wright (unpublished manuscript). 
22 Ibid. 
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tasty> at t2, i, then, has to be grounded in a justification for <s is tasty> that the subject had at some 
earlier time and informational state. Thus, no present evidence can give the subject a first-time 
justification for a past-taste proposition. Therefore, we have no failure of the right-to-left direction 
of the J-Link—and thus no witness to DDL-2. 
Let us examine the right-to-left direction of the J-link. The ground for its failure is that 
whereas justification is defeasible, truth is not. This leads to the first Diachronic Divergence Lemma: 
(DDL-1) ∃i, k ∃t2,t1 (t2>t1): [J[i,t1](p) & T[t1](p) & T[t2](Was:p) & not-J[k,t2](Was:p)].  
Whereas the truth of <p> at a time t1 is a ground for the truth of <Was: p> at a later time t2, a ground 
for the justification of <p> at t1, i can fail to be a ground for the justification of <Was: p> at a later 
time t2 and informational state k. This is because at t2 a defeater targeting the justification of <p> is 
acquired.  
A defeater for <p> is a piece of p-relevant information that precludes justifiably believing 
<p>. There are two types of defeaters: i) overriders, defeaters for <p> whose effect is that of 
providing direct evidential support for some other proposition <q>, such that <q> if and only if <not-
p>; ii) underminers, defeaters for <p> whose effect is that of providing evidence that undercuts 
either the source of justification for <p>, or the evidence-acquiring methods employed by the subject 
in support of <p>, without providing direct epistemic support for <not-p>. We first consider the 
effect of overriders and then that of underminers on the left-to-right direction of the J-link. We argue 
that in both cases this direction of the J-link does not fail for taste propositions. 
5.1 Case 1: Overriders 
Suppose a subject S tastes s at t1 and informational state i, finding it tasty. She acquires a justification 
for <s is tasty> at t1, i— let’s call the latter proposition SUSHI. At a later time t2 and informational 
state k, S comes to know that s was prepared in poor hygienic conditions thus provoking disgust in 
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her. This information has the putative effect of overriding S’s justification for SUSHI. There are two 
relevant scenarios: (i) such information is acquired absent of any concurrent gustatory experience 
of s; (ii) the information is acquired while tasting s again. In the first scenario, given the primacy of 
experience, such information is epistemically irrelevant to the gustatory assessment of s. When 
acquired in isolation from any concurrent gustatory experience of s, such information does not 
succeed in overriding the justification for SUSHI that S acquired through gustatory experience. What 
such information does achieve, nevertheless, is to defeat the implicit presupposition that the food 
was prepared in standard hygienic conditions. Although this does not per se defeat our justification 
for the judgement that s is delicious, it might preclude our right to claim it. Therefore, this case does 
not offer a counterexample to the J-link. If, however, such information is acquired when S undergoes 
a new gustatory experience of s, then, because the sense of disgust is associated with the particular 
qualitative aspect engendered by her current gustatory experience of s, such a piece of information 
would have epistemic relevance. Does it count as an overrider for the justification S had at t1, i for 
SUSHI capable of sustaining DDL-1? We argue that it doesn’t. 
Suppose that i is the informational state that S has at t1 in relation to SUSHI and that k is an 
extension of i at t2 such that it provides an overrider for SUSHI: 
 
[1] J[i,t1](SUSHI) & not-J[k,t2](Was:SUSHI) (Assumption) 
 
Every fact about taste is perspectival—we express this by means of the operator “@St”. Thus, <@St 
p> is the proposition that <p> holds relative to S’s taste perspective at t. The @-operator can be 
placed in front of a proposition—e.g., <@St SUSHI>, which is the proposition that <SUSHI> holds 
from S’s taste perspective at t—but it can also be placed in front of truth-value ascriptions relativized 
to times—e.g., <@St2 T[t1](<SUSHI>)>, which is the proposition that <SUSHI> is true relative to t1 
from S’s taste perspective at t2. Assume that at S’s taste perspective at t1<SUSHI> is true at t1: 
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[2] @St1 T[t1](<SUSHI>) (Assumption) 
 
Suppose further that the overrider is given by the change of taste experienced by S at t2: 
 
[3] @St2 S's experiences of s changes so that S doesn’t have a pleasant GR to s anymore 
(Assumption) 
 
Given RRD, S’s world of taste changes in tandem with her gustatory responses, and the extension 
of the property of tastiness (TASTY) varies accordingly, no longer including s: 
 
[4] @St2 the extension of TASTY changes (RRD:3) 
 
Hence, given the change of extension of TASTY, in the world of taste individuated by S’s taste at 
t2, it is no longer true, relative to t2, that s is tasty: 
 
[5] @St2 not-T[t2](<SUSHI>) (4) 
 
Moreover, the perspectival immersion feature entails that the ground for the truth of <SUSHI> 
relative to t1 is irrelevant from the point of view of the world of taste individuated by S’s taste at t2: 
 
[6] @St2 the change of S's GRs reshapes the world of taste S so as to make the positive 
experience that S had at t1 irrelevant for the determination of the extension of TASTY 
(Metaphysical Relativism: 4) 
 
Hence, given the change of extension of TASTY, in the world of taste individuated by S’s taste at 
t2, it is no longer true, relative to t1, that s is tasty: 
 
[7] @St2 not-T[t1](<SUSHI>) (6) 
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Given the T-link this is tantamount to saying that: 
 
[8] @St2 not-T[t2](<Was:SUSHI>) (T-Link: 7) 
 
Given epistemic relativism, S’s taste perspective impacts on the epistemic significance of a piece of 
information. The change of taste that S undergoes at t2, k, also makes irrelevant what, in the world 
of taste of t1, i constituted a justification for believing <SUSHI>: 
 
[9] @St2 the change of subject's GRs reshapes S’s world of taste thus making the gustatory 
experience with a pleasant phenomenological character that S has at t1 irrelevant for the 
justification at t2 for <SUSHI> (Epistemic Relativism: 3).  
 
This is to say: 
 
[10] @St2 not-J[i,t1](<SUSHI>) (9) 
 
Therefore, the presence of an overrider at t2 does not support DDL-1.  
 Strictly speaking, line 1 of the argument has to be rewritten using the @-operator, and since 
there is no world of taste where line 1 holds, there is no world of taste where there is an overrider. 
This fact generalizes: in no world of taste do we have a witness to DDL-1—i.e., at no time do we 
have a situation sustaining a divergence between truth and justification. Notice that the T-Link fails 
at no time—i.e., in no world of taste. We only have cross-time/world failures of the T-Link (lines 7 
& 2). Analogously, the J-Link fails at no time—i.e., in no world of taste. We only have cross-
time/world failures of the J-Link—the fact that at t2, not-J[k,t2](<Was:SUSHI>) and the fact that at 
t1, J[i,t1](<SUSHI>). Thus, at no time—from within a world of taste—can a divergence between truth 
and justification occur, since failures of either links can occur only at different times involving 
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different taste worlds. However, owing to metaphysical relativism, two facts belonging to different 
worlds do not constitute a (conjunctive) fact, since worlds of taste are, as it were, insulated. Cases 
of inter-world divergence cannot provide a witness for DDL-1, nor for the failure of the T-link. 
5.2 Case 2: Underminers 
Let’s consider the effect of underminers on the right-to-left direction of the J-Link. We discuss two 
cases: the pill case and the ginger case.  
Suppose that at t1 S tastes s and has a pleasant response. Thus, S at t1 is in an informational 
state i that justifies <SUSHI>—i.e., <s is tasty>. Moreover, assume that <SUSHI> is true relative to 
t1 and suppose that at t2 S comes to know that at t1 she was under the effect of a pill that altered her 
physiology by interfering with the phenomenological character of her previous gustatory experience. 
Let’s add this potentially undermining information to S’s informational state k at t2. What happens 
to the justification of <Was:SUSHI>? If that additional information were to work as an underminer, 
the result would be that S lacks justification for <Was:SUSHI> relative to t2 and informational state 
k. However, this is not what happens. Given the primacy of experience, the information that S is 
under the effect of the pill has no epistemic consequence for the justification of both <SUSHI> and 
<Was:SUSHI>. What matters, epistemically, is merely that the original gustatory experience of s at 
t1 which, if pleasant, gives the subject a justification for <SUSHI> and also for <Was:SUSHI>—
provided, ex hypothesi, that the subject undergoes no other gustatory experience between t1 and t2. 
Consider now the ginger case. Suppose that S at t1 tastes s with a pair of chopsticks which, 
unbeknownst to her, were used to eat ginger, leaving the chopsticks with a residue of ginger g. In 
tasting s, contaminated with g, S has an unpleasant gustatory experience, and thus she judges that s 
is distasteful—call N–SUSHI the proposition <s is distasteful>. Later, at t2, she comes to know that 
someone used the chopsticks to eat ginger. She thereby rejects her previous judgment since she 
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realizes she now lacks justification for thinking that s wasn’t tasty. Does this case bear witness to 
DDL-1? We do not think so since, while we have—not-J[k,t2](<Was:N–SUSHI>)—we lack—
J[i,t1](<N–SUSHI>). This is because the object of taste at t1 was the composed object s+g—i.e., sushi 
plus ginger piece—and not s alone. The proposition (call it N–GUSHY) for which she has a 
justification at t1 is thus<s+g is distasteful>—J[i,t1](<N–GUSHI>). Thus, no witness of DDL-1 is 
forthcoming, which means that no divergence lemma can be sustained invoking an underminer. 
 To summarize, we have shown two things. First, given our epistemic relativism in tandem 
with the primacy of experience we cannot have genuine overriders. Typically, the way overriders 
work requires the coexistence within the same informational state of two competing pieces of 
information: the original evidence supporting <p>, and the defeating evidence supporting some <q>, 
semantically incompatible with <p>. However, given the primacy of experience, nothing but 
gustatory experience has epistemic efficacy with respect to judgements of taste and, given epistemic 
relativism, whenever there is a change in the epistemic perspective of a subject, the gustatory 
experience that counted as evidence from her previous epistemic perspective loses its epistemic 
efficacy within her new perspective. Thus, in the case of taste we never have a situation in which 
two epistemically relevant, competing pieces of information coexist within the same perspective. 
As a result, the only epistemic effect that a piece of information (which would typically act as an 
overrider) can have in the taste domain is that of spoiling whatever former evidence a subject had 
of any epistemic relevance.  
Second, there is no possibility of a genuine underminer. Given the primacy of experience, 
the only kind of information that has epistemic relevance is the subject’s gustatory experience, so 
any other evidence that the subject may acquire, including the information that something might 
have interfered with her previous gustatory experience in such a way as to alter her GRs, has no 
epistemic force. IA2 is thus blocked.  
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6. Alethic dualism 
Let us take stock. We have argued that there is at least one domain (taste) where, in virtue of its 
peculiar subjectivist and relativist metaphysics and epistemology, IAs fail. There, truth and 
justification are normatively indistinguishable. Thus, truth in the taste domain does not have a 
distinctively normative nature. This result is compatible with two further corollaries: (i) that truth is 
never distinctively normative; (ii) that truth is distinctively normative in other domains with a 
different metaphysics and epistemology. In fact, we believe that upshot (ii) obtains. The failure of 
the IAs is tied to local features of the domain of taste: when a domain does not exhibit these features, 
Normative Divergence holds. As a result, truth emerges as a normative property for those domains. 
This establishes a form of alethic dualism—or so we argue. 
 In particular, we defend two theses. First, that Normative Divergence holds in (at least) two 
domains. All we need to do is to show that one of the IAs—for simplicity, we consider only IA1—
goes through in the domains of arithmetic and astronomy. Second, we argue that the local soundness 
of IA1 has notable repercussions in the metaphysics of truth since it establishes a form of alethic 
dualism.  
 Let’s call an argument an ordered couple with set propositions (its premises) and a 
proposition (its conclusion). An argument is sound just in case all of its premises are true and its 
conclusion logically follows from its premises. An argument-schema is sound relative to a domain 
D just in case none of its instantiations in D gives rise to an unsound argument. Let us further 
stipulate that an argument-schema is locally sound just in case it is sound relative to (at least) one 
domain and unsound relative to (at least) another domain. The local soundness of an argument-
schema entails that it is sound relative to some but not all domains. Finally, an argument-schema is 
globally sound just in case it is sound relative to all domains. 
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 Our claim is that the taste domain is a counterexample to the global soundness of the IAs. 
Since all taste propositions are immune to epistemic neutrality, IA1 is unsound there. Analogously, 
since the J-Links fail for all taste propositions, IA2 is unsound relative to the taste domain. However, 
relative to some other domains the step of Normative Divergence in IA1 goes through. This opens 
the possibility that IA1 is locally sound. In fact, we now show that IA1 is locally sound by showing 
that Normative Divergence holds in the domains of arithmetic and astronomy. To accomplish this, 
it suffices to show that for each of these domains there is at least one proposition satisfying epistemic 
neutrality. 
 It is uncontroversial that in many domains the epistemology and metaphysics we outlined 
for the taste domain is inadequate. As a matter of fact, in many domains epistemic neutrality is 
common and thus Normative Divergence holds. Consider the following proposition: 
(MOON) The mass of the Moon is approximately 7.35•1022 kg. 
One might ignore what the mass of the Moon is and thereby be in a position of epistemic neutrality 
with respect to MOON. However, we take it that it is undeniable that, as a matter of fact, MOON is 
true. Hence, Normative Divergence holds for such a case. Consider now the following proposition 
from the domain of arithmetic:  
(PRIME) Primes become less common as they become larger.23 
A subject might ignore the fact that primes become less common as they become larger since she/he 
might lack any procedure for assessing the truth of PRIME. In this respect, this subject would be in 
                                                 
23 PRIME is an intuitive formulation of the Prime Number Theorem, which describes the asymptotic distribution of the 
prime numbers among the positive integers. A first elementary proof—i.e., a proof that can be carried within first-order 
Peano Arithmetic—was given by Atle Selberg in 1949. 
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a position of epistemic neutrality with respect to PRIME. However, it is undeniable that, again, as a 
matter of fact, PRIME is true. 
 Thus, IA1 is sound relative to these two domains. This has notable repercussions for the 
metaphysics of truth. It establishes that there are domains with different truth properties: one with a 
normative nature (arithmetic and astronomy), the other with a non-normative nature (taste). This 
suffices to establish that there are at least two metaphysically distinct truth-properties and thus to 
justify a version of alethic dualism. 
7. From alethic dualism to ecumenical alethic pluralism via the scope problem 
Alethic dualism establishes a new way of developing a pluralist framework based on the coexistence 
of a normative property and non-normative property. Since pluralists have typically excluded the 
possibility of having a non-normative truth property—arguing only for a plurality of normative truth 
properties—alethic dualism constitutes a new way of arguing for pluralism, while also being an 
interesting position in its own right. In this section, we explain how alethic dualism can be integrated 
within a more general pluralistic framework. This establishes Ecumenical Alethic Pluralism. We 
achieve this by relying on what is considered to be the main argument in favour of alethic pluralism: 
the so-called scope problem.24  
 The scope problem is based on the observation that there is variability in the epistemological 
and metaphysical features of domains. Moreover, this variability is symptomatic of a further 
variability in the truth properties of those domains. Consider, for example, the astronomical domain. 
There, it is intuitive to think that our true beliefs concern mind-independent objects (such as planets), 
which causally interact with us. These features make it highly plausible to think of truth in astronomy 
                                                 
24 Lynch (2009, 32-6, 41-9). 
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in terms of a correspondence theory of truth.25 On this understanding, MOON is true because it is 
in a relation of causal correspondence to the mind-independent fact that the Moon is approximately 
7.35•1022 kg.  
 When considering arithmetic, some of the features mentioned in relation to astronomy do 
not (uncontroversially) apply. In particular, it is implausible to think of numbers as objects with 
which we have a causal relation. This difficulty is highlighted by the well-known “Benacerraf's 
dilemma”.26 Hence, causal correspondence is arguably inadequate when it comes to modelling truth 
in arithmetic. Indeed, PRIME is not true in virtue of our being in a causal relation with natural 
numbers. Among the possible models for arithmetical truth, a promising one is coherence with a set 
of axioms—e.g., Wright (1998, 234-36). On this model, the truth of PRIME consists in its being 
derivable from the axioms of Peano Arithmetic.27 
 The scope problem is thus an argument for the existence of a plurality of domain-specific 
truth properties. In particular, the previous remarks give us reason to think that the (normative) truth 
properties operating in, respectively, astronomy and arithmetic are different. If we add this result to 
alethic dualism, we have reason to think that there are (at least) three different truth-properties: a 
non-normative one for the domain of taste; the normative property of causal correspondence for the 
domain of astronomy; and the normative property of coherence for the domain of arithmetic. Note, 
moreover, that this pattern can be replicated in relation to other domains. That is to say, the scope 
problem—in tandem with variations in the metaphysics and epistemology of other domains—can 
deliver a variety of truth properties bearing both a normative and non-normative nature.  
                                                 
25 E.g., Lynch (2009, Ch. 3, and Ch. 7).  
26 Benacerraf (1973). 
27 Coherence with the axioms of PA is just one model of truth in arithmetic that provides a metaphysically more 
acceptable account than correspondence. Of course, we do not wish to claim that this is the only, or even the best, model 
of truth for arithmetic: we just want to provide an example of a viable alternative to an account of truth that is widely 
considered inadequate for arithmetic. 
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 We have thus shown how to establish EAP. This form of pluralism is wider in scope than 
those hitherto developed in the literature to the extent that it includes (at least one) non-normative 
truth property. The following chart illustrates where to locate EAP within the current debate on the 
metaphysics of truth: 
 
Figure 1. Truth: a new theoretical landscape. 
An important issue requiring further scrutiny relates to how far EAP can go in its ecumenism. Those 
domains in which truth is non-normative are potential candidates for being domains whereby truth 
is locally deflationary. Once we take on board EAP, nothing excludes the possibility that the non-
normative truth property (or properties) permitted in the framework is (are) purely deflationary. 
Such a possibility has thus far been regarded as a form of heresy within the pluralist camp, and we 
think that the reason for such inflationary dogmatism is the unanimous endorsement of the global 
soundness of IAs. However, to comprehensively demonstrate the possibility of a local deflationary 
truth more needs to be done. In particular, we need to show not only that the IAs fail locally, but 
also that other important inflationary challenges fail.28 This is material for further work. 
8. Locating ecumenical alethic pluralism within the alethic pluralism debate 
                                                 
28 Four of them are prominent: i) the so-called Success Argument—Putnam (1978), Damnjanovic (2005); ii) the Semantic 
Argument—Bar-On, Horisk and Lycan (2000), Patterson (2005); iii) the Indeterminacy Argument—Horwich (2005), 
Field (2009); iv) the Axiological Argument—Horwich (2006), Lynch (2009) and Ferrari (2018). 
  
Forthcoming in the Canadian Journal of Philosophy 
 
 
27 
Before concluding, let us first consider two issues at the core of the pluralist debate, which have not 
yet been dealt with in developing our proposal, and which could further help to locate EAP within 
the current debate. The first (issue #1) has to do with how to conceive of the truth concept within 
the EAP framework. The second (issue #2) concerns what model(s) of the relation between the truth 
concept and truth properties best fits our proposal.  
 With regard to issue #1, the most successful models of alethic pluralism developed thus far 
in the literature29 provide an analysis of the concept of truth in line with the so-called network 
analysis.30 On this approach, the concept of truth is characterized by a collection of platitudes that 
connect it to a network of other concepts—such as belief, assertion, correctness, enquiry, etc.—thus 
specifying the functional role that the truth concept plays within the network.31 This analysis ensures 
conceptual unity while allowing for variation at the level of truth properties—viz., those properties 
that can play the truth role in relation to different subject matters.  
 The network analysis is standardly understood as involving two stages. First, a set of core 
features (or, as they are typically termed in the literature, “platitudes”) concerning the analysandum 
(e.g., truth) is assembled.32 This set provides a theory of the target concept by laying down its 
theoretical role. Second, in relation to the metaphysical commitments of the theory, it is argued that 
whatever satisfies the theoretical role defined by the core principles is an admissible realiser of the 
concept. As Nolan (2009) points out, both stages of the network analysis are open to interpretation. 
With regard to the first stage, core principles can be understood along a Strict Conception. This is 
to say that they are analytic to the concept and therefore non-negotiable. Other, less strict, 
                                                 
29 E.g., Wright (1998), Lynch (2000), (2009), Pedersen (2010), and Edwards (2013). 
30 This methodology has been adopted by, e.g., Jackson (1998), Lewis (1970) and Wright (1998).  
31 Core principles about truth are generally taken to be tacit beliefs that folks have reflecting and systematizing their 
ordinary understanding of truth—e.g., Lynch (2009, 7-8)—or the philosophers’ ordinary understanding of truth reached 
through a process of critical philosophical reflection—e.g., Wright (2013, 128-9). 
32 Examples of lists of core principles concerning the truth concept are in Wright (1998), and Lynch (2009). 
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interpretations take the core principles either as conditional on the existence of the postulated 
entities—i.e., if there were Xs then X-core principles would be true—or by providing a more 
externalist understanding—e.g., X is defined as the entity to which experts intend to refer with ‘X’. 
These different interpretations of the first stage come with different views of the second stage. The 
Strict Conception fits the idea that X is the entity satisfying the theoretical role as defined by all the 
core principles with no exceptions. Let’s call this the Strict Requirement. The more one departs from 
the Strict Conception the more one can be flexible vis-à-vis the requirements for satisfying the 
theoretical role. If no entity perfectly satisfies the theoretical role defined by the core principles of 
X, one might still have recourse to the following options: (i) to require satisfaction of most of the 
core principles about X; (ii) to require satisfaction of the most important core principles (after some 
weighing of them); (iii) or satisfaction of most of the important core principles (Nolan 2009: 269).33  
 EAP, as a form of pluralism employing the methodology of network analysis, has to say 
something in relation to the two aforementioned stages, in particular on the nature of the core 
principles—i.e., which are the core principles for truth and what is their status? There is furthermore 
the question of how to address so-called “locational problems”34 in relation to truth—what are the 
requirements in order for a property to play the role defined by the core principles, and how flexible 
are they? A detailed account of how best to conceive of the network analysis within the EAP 
framework would require a dedicated project. Here we can only hint at what we take to be the most 
plausible strategy for tackling this complex set of issues. EAP allows for a truth property that is non-
normative. Most pluralist frameworks include among their core principles some normative 
principles. Take, for example, Lynch’s Norm of Belief, according to which a belief is prima facie 
                                                 
33 Wright (1998) holds onto both Strict Conception and Strict Requirement. Lynch (2009, 13) departs from the Strict 
Requirement. 
34 See Jackson (1998, 2-5). 
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correct if and only if its content is true.35 Alternatively, take Wright’s Contrast Platitude36, the idea 
that a proposition may be true without being justified, and vice versa, thereby securing the potential 
extensional divergence between truth and justification at the heart of the IAs. EAP is committed to 
denying that the truth-realiser in the domain of taste satisfies Contrast and Norm of Belief. Thus, 
either Contrast and Norm of Belief are not core principles in EAP, or EAP must reject the Strict 
Requirement. We conjecture that the most feasible strategy to adopt for an advocate of EAP is to at 
least retain Norm of Belief among the core principles, but then to reject Strict Requirement. The 
advocate of EAP should then argue that although the truth concept imposes some normative 
constraint on belief—as specified by Norm of Belief—in certain domains (e.g., that of taste) the best 
realiser of the core principles does not reflect this normative aspect and thus has a non-normative 
nature. The reasons for this are complex and have to do with issue #2, to which we now turn. 
 Two models of how to understand the relationship between the conceptual and metaphysical 
components of alethic pluralism have been discussed in the literature. The first model—known as 
Strong Pluralism—maintains that there is one truth concept and a plurality of truth properties, each 
of which operates as the truth property for one or more domains, with no generic truth property 
applying to all domains. The second model—Moderate Pluralism—agrees with the first model on 
the analysis of the concept, but also maintains that in addition to the various domain-specific truth 
properties, there is a generic truth property operating across all discourses. In a phrase, truth is 
metaphysically both one and many. The exact mechanics of how unity and plurality are achieved at 
the metaphysical level depends on the view in question (for example whether we are talking about 
                                                 
35 See Lynch (2009, 10), and Pedersen and Wright (2013, 109). Edwards (2013) assumes truth to be normative by taking 
seriously the analogy between truth and winning. We think that Wright’s IAS’s are the main reason for the widespread 
idea among pluralists that truth is normative. 
36 See Wright (1998, 60) and Edwards (2013, 113). 
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disjunctivist pluralism,37 second order functionalism,38 manifestation pluralism,39 or simple 
determination pluralism).40 Thus, the question is: what is the best model for EAP?  
 As noted above, EAP has two options: either dropping one or both of Contrast and Norm of 
Belief (and other normative core principles), or abandoning the Strict Requirement. If the first option 
is chosen, EAP is compatible with all of the aforementioned models of alethic pluralism. However, 
this option has a drawback: the fewer core principles there are, the harder is to address the alethic 
locational problem, for there might be many candidates satisfying the alethic role, none of which 
can be singled out as the best. For this reason, it is better for EAP to endorse the second option by 
abandoning the Strict Requirement. Doing so has consequences on the availability for EAP of 
moderate models insofar as the generic truth property usually integrates, as essential to its nature, 
those normative features individuated by Norm of Belief and Contrast. Let us illustrate this with the 
most prominent example of a moderate model: Lynch’s Manifestation Pluralism. If in manifestation 
pluralism Norm of Belief and Contrast, as well as other core principles (“core truisms” in Lynch’s 
terminology), are essential features of generic truth, then there can be no domain where truth fails 
to have a normative nature since generic truth is immanent in every truth-realiser.41  
 Thus, on the basis of these brief remarks, we believe that EAP is more easily integrated 
within a strong pluralism framework. More, of course, needs to be said on this issue. Nevertheless, 
for the purposes of this paper we rest content having merely sketched how to locate EAP within the 
rather complex array of pluralist proposals.42  
                                                 
37 Pedersen and Wright (2013).  
38 Lynch (2000).  
39 Lynch (2009). 
40 Edwards (2013). 
41 Analogous points can be made for Simple Determination Pluralism. It is less clear that the abandonment of Strict 
Requirement makes EAP incompatible with second-order functionalism and alethic disjunctivism. 
42 See Ferrari and Moruzzi (unpublished manuscript) for a detailed discussion of what we call “the integration 
challenge”. 
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9. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have explored the possibility of developing an ecumenical form of alethic pluralism 
(EAP). We have considered two inflationary arguments mounted against the availability of a non-
normative truth property and thus, a fortiori, against the possibility of EAP. We have argued that 
given a certain metaphysics and epistemology of taste these arguments fail in that domain. This 
failure makes space for a non-normative truth property operating in the domain of taste. We have 
also argued that Wright’s first Inflationary Argument (IA1) goes through in at least two domains, 
astronomy and arithmetic, whereby truth should be conceived as normative. This establishes what 
we have called Alethic Dualism, which can be seen as a novel way to argue for a form of pluralism 
based on the existence of two kinds of truth property: one normative, and another non-normative. 
Relying on the scope problem, as applied to the domains of astronomy and arithmetic, we have 
argued that these two domains do not share the same truth property. We have briefly suggested that 
whereas causal-correspondence seems the right kind of truth property in astronomy, something like 
coherence with the basic axioms of Peano Arithmetic might work better for arithmetic. This gives 
us a new form of pluralism: Ecumenical Alethic Pluralism. This is wider in scope than traditional 
forms of alethic pluralism insofar as it includes, among a variety of normative truth properties, a 
non-normative property. Finally, we briefly discussed how to locate this new form of alethic 
pluralism within the current debate.43 
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